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I. To Mirandize, or not to Mirandize: The Case of the Boston Bomber. 
 
 Tragedy struck the Atlantic coast when on April 15, 2013 at 2:49 p.m. EDT two 
bombs exploded at the Boston Marathon finish line, killing three people and injuring 282 
others.  A massive manhunt ensued and large parts of the City of Boston were shut down 
to facilitate the search for Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, two brothers who were 
suspected of carrying through a terrorist plot.  On April 19, 2013, Americans were glued 
to their televisions, watching as authorities cornered Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in an abandoned 
boat outside of Boston in Watertown, MA.  After Tsarnaev was taken into custody, the 
question immediately turned to whether or not he should be read his Miranda rights as 
presumably required by the landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1  At the press 
conference announcing the capture of Tsarnaev, the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts, 
Carmen Ortiz, announced that the government could cite New York v. Quarles2 and the 
Public Safety Exception to the Miranda requirement in cases of terrorism.  
 From past experience, the Obama Administration was profoundly aware of the 
political consequences of informing terrorism suspects of their constitutional rights. On 
Christmas Day in 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was accused of boarding a plane 
from Amsterdam to the United States with the intent of detonating explosives that were 
hidden in his undergarments.   The suspect was immediately taken to the hospital where 
                                                
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
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FBI agents began interrogating him for just under an hour.3  After Abdulmutallab made it 
clear to authorities that he no longer wanted to talk to them, FBI officials informed the 
suspect of his rights after deliberating with officials from the State Department, Justice 
Department, FBI, and the CIA.4  Republicans were immediately critical about the 
decision to inform the suspect of his rights, especially the Obama Administration’s policy 
that allowed terrorism suspects to be processed through the civilian criminal justice 
system.  In a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) 
wrote:  
It appears that the decision not to thoroughly interrogate Abdulmutallab 
was made by you or other senior officials in the Department of Justice . . . 
We remain deeply troubled that this paramount requirement of national 
security was ignored – or worse yet, not recognized – due to the 
administration’s preoccupation with reading the Christmas Day bomber 
his Miranda rights.5 
 
In response to these criticisms, the Justice Department formulated a policy for handling 
these sensitive interrogation situations.   
The Department of Justice announced its legal policy of invoking the Quarles 
Public Safety Exception in the event that public safety becomes a concern.  The FBI 
memo instructed agents to treat terrorism suspects in the following way:  
If applicable, agents should ask any and all questions that are reasonably 
prompted by an immediate concern for the safety of the public or the 
arresting agents without advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights…After 
all applicable public safety questions have been exhausted, agents should 
                                                
3 Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Officials OKd Miranda Warning for Accused 
Airline Plotter, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/01/nation/la-na-terror-miranda1-2010feb01. 
4 Id. 
5 See Kasie Hunt, Republicans Rip Eric Holder on Miranda Rights for Underwear 
Bomber, POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/32073.html. 
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advise the arrestee of his Miranda rights and seek a waiver of those right 
before any further interrogation occurs.6   
 
Immediately after U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz explained to the media the Justice 
Department policy of invoking the Public Safety Exception in response to the Boston 
Bombing incident, there was a scrum by analysts to find out what the Public Safety 
Exception entailed.  Some analysts were immediately critical of the decision to invoke 
the Public Safety Exception in response to the capture of Tsarnaev.  Emily Bazelon wrote 
for Slate that,  
There is one specific circumstance in which it makes sense to hold off on 
Miranda.  It’s exactly what the name of the exception suggests.  The 
police can interrogate a suspect without offering him the benefit of 
Miranda if he could have information that’s of urgent concern for public 
safety . . . The problem is that Attorney General Eric Holder has stretched 
the law beyond that scenario.  And that should trouble anyone who 
worries about the police railroading suspects, which can end in false 
confessions.7 
   
Bazelon’s response represents just one perspective from the widespread public debate 
that erupted after the Obama Administration declared its legal policy with respect to the 
legal rights of potential terror suspects. This is a debate that continues to this day and has 
important legal consequences for the rights of criminal suspects. 
Invoking the Public Safety Exception to interrogate terrorism suspects without 
informing them of their Miranda rights raises important questions in a political system 
where the judiciary oversees the power of authorities to gather information from the 
                                                
6 Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. (OCT. 19, 2010) (on file with the 
Dept. of Justice), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-memo-ciot.pdf). 
7 Emily Bazelon, Why Should I Care That No One’s Reading Dzhokhar Tsarnaev His 
Miranda Rights?, SLATE (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:29 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarna
ev_and_miranda_rights_the_public_safety_exception_and_terrorism.html. 
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accused. In this article, we review the development of the Miranda rule prior to its 
adoption by the United States Supreme Court by placing it in the context of the 
Congressional debate over the evidentiary rule announced in Mallory v. United States.8  It 
is important to understand the political and legal context surrounding the Miranda 
warning because doing so may help us reach normative conclusions about whether terror 
suspects, such as Tsarnaev, should be informed of their rights prior to interrogation.   
Using a neo-institutionalist perspective,9 we show that the Miranda rule was 
developed after a number of critical institutional interactions that occurred between the 
various branches of American government as the nation debated over the problem of 
crime and processing criminal suspects who were in the custody of law enforcement 
officers. It is not our intention here to argue that the debates occurring in Congress prior 
to Miranda were causal explanations of the ruling.  Instead, we argue that these 
institutional interactions and, thus, political supports preceding and arguably shaping the 
Miranda decision were absent when the Burger Court formulated the Quarles Public 
Safety Exception.  Prior to the Court’s announcement in Miranda (1966), and after the 
ruling in Mallory (1957), we show in the following pages that Congress struggled for a 
decade to reach consensus on how to inform criminal suspects of their rights when in the 
custody of federal officials or authorities in the District of Columbia. During this time, 
we also show that a small group of Senators successfully obstructed the legislative 
                                                
8 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), modified by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
3501 (2013), as recognized in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009). 
9 See SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1–12 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004); MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH 
PERSPECTIVE 3–12 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).  
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progress that was made toward achieving consensus on the question of the rights of 
criminal suspects.  When legislative obstructions proved insurmountable, we argue that 
the U.S. Supreme Court was instrumental in breaking through the political stalemate by 
handing down the Miranda ruling.  
By any measure, the ruling handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda 
v. Arizona was an unpopular one with conservatives who later proposed legislation to 
overturn the decision.  How is judicial review justified when the Supreme Court hands 
down such seemingly unpopular decisions like the one in Miranda? As a number of 
scholars have demonstrated in other legal conflicts, legislatures are prone to a variety of 
obstructions that discourage legislative policy development and when the Supreme Court 
intervenes, a close examination often uncovers an infrastructure of political support for 
its rulings.10  Rather than acting in a counter-majoritarian manner, the Court can 
legitimize the preferences of popular majorities by helping political coalitions overcome 
legislative obstructionists, especially those using the supermajority mechanisms of 
institutions like the U.S. Senate to keep legislative from passing.  We argue that Miranda 
v. Arizona has similar political foundations because it occurred after Congress engaged in 
a robust political debate that bore no fruit due to the successful actions of legislative 
obstructionists who supported maintaining the legal status quo that was in place after the 
Court handed down Mallory v. United States.    
We show that the ruling in Miranda was a judicially-created compromise that 
reconciled the desire of Northern Democrats to maintain the practice of U.S. 
                                                
10 See Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for 
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 583 (2005); see also SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 28–42. 
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Commissioners informing suspects of their rights with the desire of Republicans and 
Southern Democrats to provide greater flexibility to law enforcement officers who would 
inform criminal suspects of their rights.11  However, the requirement that these 
procedures be followed at the state-level proved too much for the coalition of Southern 
Democratic Senators like Sam Ervin (D-NC) and John McClellan (D-AR) who were 
strong advocates for states’ rights and also members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  
This probably explains why there was a significant backlash among Republicans and 
Southern Democrats even though, as we show, Miranda warnings were nearly identical to 
the federal statutory language that was widely supported by this coalition in Congress. 
Congress responded in 1968 with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, a 
statute that included a provision overriding Miranda by instituting the pre-Miranda 
voluntariness test,12 although the main thrust of the statute was to provide law 
enforcement assistance to the states through block grants rather than to censure the Court.  
If the provision invalidating Miranda was not included in the legislation, then the statute 
                                                
11 Our observation is consistent with others who observed that: 
Miranda was something of a compromise. The Court did not forbid all 
interrogations without counsel, as some had invited it to do and as others 
had feared it might hold in the wake of Escobedo. Interrogations still 
could continue, but within set procedures that would protect Fifth 
Amendment rights. Nor did the Court prohibit police officers from 
questioning people who possess relevant information, but are not suspects 
of any crime. By limiting its application to custodial interrogations, the 
Justices narrowed Miranda’s bite to situations in which suspects 
legitimately need Fifth Amendment protections because custodial 
questioning aims to elicit incriminating information. 
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 121 (1998).  
12 “[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, it must 
not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied 
promises, however slight.” WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, 3 A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS 478 ( London, Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1896).  
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was bound to fail because it needed support from the Southern Democrats who 
considered overriding Miranda among the highest of their priorities.  In fact, it was such 
a parochial provision that future presidents, including Nixon, ignored it and instructed 
federal officers to continue using Miranda as a matter of federal policy for treating 
criminal suspects.  This extensive background demonstrates that prior to and following 
the Miranda decision, there was robust political debate and ongoing institutional 
dialogues between Congress, the Court, and the executive branch that shaped policy over 
how we treat criminal suspects and how much flexibility is granted to law enforcement 
officers.    
Through our examination of the Congressional Record, however, we found almost 
no debate in Congress or in the executive branch about emphasizing public safety 
through an exception to the exclusionary rule that was articulated in Miranda. Therefore, 
we argue that the Public Safety Exception announced in Quarles did not receive the same 
amount of full-throated and robust Congressional debate that occurred prior to the 
Miranda ruling and that, while the rule announced in Miranda helped overcome a 
legislative obstruction and bore the qualities of a doctrine possessing political 
foundations, the Quarles exception is a prominent example of judicial policymaking that 
deserves greater Congressional attention and debate, especially as applied to terrorism 
suspects.     
We begin our analysis by describing the historical development of Supreme Court 
decisions leading up to the Miranda decision.  In doing so, we pay particular attention to 
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the Court’s decision in Mallory v. United States,13 a case that is one of the first to explore 
the admissibility of confessions in the District of Columbia.  In the immediate aftermath 
of Mallory v. United States, we also show how Congress debated about the procedural 
safeguards meant to protect those held in custody by law enforcement officers in the 
District of Columbia, and how that debate shaped the decision that was handed down in 
Miranda.  We continue by outlining Congress’s decision to send law enforcement 
assistance to the states through block grants in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.14 This response included a provision weakening the Miranda Rule, 
but ignored by future presidents and struck down by the Rehnquist Court in Dickerson v. 
United States.  We conclude our analysis by describing how the Quarles Public Safety 
Exception has been applied by the lower courts and what this exception means in light of 
our “democratic experience” with Miranda warnings. 
II. The Mallory Rule and the Congressional Debate to Inform Suspects of their 
Rights. 
 
In the 1930s and the 1940s, the U.S. Supreme Court began examining police 
practices that produced involuntary confessions.15  In one case, the Court reviewed 
                                                
13 See Mallory, 354 U.S. at 449. Another important case that preceded Mallory was 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), modified by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as 
recognized in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318 (2009). McNabb involved 
confessions received by federal law enforcement officials while holding criminal suspects 
in custody. For the purposes of this project, we focus on Mallory to demonstrate the 
legislative response immediately leading up to Miranda.  
14 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2013).  
15 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 1067 (8th ed. 2011). 
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involuntary confessions documented in Brown v. Mississippi,16 where a Mississippi state 
deputy admitted to whipping and hanging a criminal suspect from a tree in order to 
extract a confession. Other suspects were brought into the station house and whipped 
until police were satisfied that they had extracted the confessions of guilt needed to 
successfully prosecute the crimes. In light of these facts, the Supreme Court refused to 
endorse the state’s limited tolerance for the zeal with which officers were pursuing 
confessions from suspects.  In reversing the decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes declared,  
The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand.  The 
State may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob 
domination…without supplying corrective process…The State may not deny to 
the accused the aid of counsel…Nor may a State, through the action of its 
officers, contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial.17  
 
Nearly twenty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court made another authoritative statement 
on the voluntariness of confessions when it handed down Mallory v. United States,18 a 
unanimous Warren Court decision, written by Justice Frankfurter, that articulated a 
federal judicial response to the voluntariness of confessions, but drew an immediate and 
negative reaction from some members of Congress. 
Mallory began when on April 7, 1954, police were called to a Washington, D.C. 
apartment complex in response to an alleged sexual assault in a basement laundry room.19   
The victim was doing laundry and sought assistance from the building janitor, who lived 
                                                
16 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  
17 Id. at 285–86.  
18 Mallory, 354 U.S. 449.  
19 Id. at 450.  
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in the apartment complex.20  When the victim sought assistance, she was greeted at the 
door by the petitioner, Andrew Mallory, the janitor’s nineteen-year old half-brother, who 
helped the victim.21  Mallory returned to his apartment, but shortly thereafter, a masked 
man fitting Mallory’s description attacked the woman in the laundry room basement.22  
When police arrived at the crime scene, Andrew Mallory was no longer at the apartment 
complex, but when he was found the next afternoon, he was questioned by authorities at 
police headquarters and confessed to the crime after submitting to a lie detector test.23  
The confession came at about 9:30 pm, was repeated several times, and was dictated to a 
typist between 11:30 pm and 12:30 am.24  In all, Andrew Mallory was held at the police 
station for a total of approximately eight hours.  Although there were attempts by police 
investigators to call the home of a U.S. Commissioner immediately after Mallory’s first 
confession, Mallory was not informed of his rights by a magistrate until the next 
morning.25 
 When Mallory was taken into custody, District of Columbia authorities were 
required to follow the “frequently ignored”26 Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which requires that “officer[s] making an arrest…shall take the arrested 
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner.”27  When 
                                                
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 451.  
25 Id.  
26 Comment, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 
1005 (1959) [hereinafter Prearraignment Interrogation]. 
27 Mallory, 354 U.S. at 451–52 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)) (emphasis added).  
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the defendant is brought before a commissioner, then that commissioner is required to 
inform the defendant of “the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel, and of 
his right to have a preliminary examination.”28  Furthermore, the Commissioner is 
required to explain to the defendant that statements are not mandatory and that any 
statements can be used against the defendant.29  Finally, the Commissioner is also 
expected to allow the defendant a reasonable amount of time to consult with an 
attorney.30  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure – applicable here – were developed 
by Article III judges and codified by Congress, so when the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled in favor of Mallory, finding that he was not taken before a magistrate 
without delay,31 the Court was ruling on a provision with which it had intimate 
experience.  In the words of the Court, “The requirement of Rule 5(a) is part of the 
procedure devised by Congress for safeguarding individual rights without hampering 
effective and intelligent law enforcement.”32  Since this rule was developed by Congress, 
it only applied in the District of Columbia and when suspects were in federal custody, but 
it is nevertheless important here because the Court’s authoritative decisions on conflicts 
occurring over federal law and in the District of Columbia sometimes foreshadow how it 
will address these issues at the state-level.33 
                                                
28 Id. at 453–54 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)).  
29 Id. at 454.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 453.  
33 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) with McDonald v. 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); compare Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) with 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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 In hearing Mallory’s appeal, the Court became concerned that Mallory did not 
fully understand his rights.34  The Court wrote, “When this inquiry of a nineteen-year-old 
lad of limited intelligence produced no confession, the police asked him to submit to a 
‘lie detector’ test.”35  Particularly troublesome to the Justices was that Mallory was not 
told about his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and that the prosecution could 
use the statements Mallory made against himself. In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter wrote 
for the Court that, “We cannot sanction this extended delay, resulting in confession, 
without subordinating the general rule of prompt arraignment to the discretion of 
arresting officers in finding exceptional circumstances for its disregard.”36  
 Almost immediately after the decision in Mallory, members of Congress were 
quick to point out that interpreting the requirement that suspects be brought before U.S. 
Commissioners “without necessary delay” invited confusion among lower federal judges.  
One of Congress’s first moves was to create a special subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee to study the Supreme Court decisions that were handed down after 
the Court’s 1956 term.37  These hearings produced countless anecdotes about the effect of 
the Mallory Rule and the impending “complete breakdown in law enforcement” as a 
consequence of “thousands of guilty persons that will be freed.”38  Members of Congress 
frequently used the Mallory Rule as evidence that Chief Justice Warren and the Supreme 
Court were allowing dangerous criminals to go free.  In the months following his release, 
                                                
34 See Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454–56. 
35 Id. at 455.  
36 Id. at 455–56.  
37 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL PROCESS 178 (1962). 
38 See id. 
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Andrew Mallory became wanted for the investigation of crimes that were committed in 
Philadelphia, which prompted members of Congress to use the Mallory case as a 
cautionary tale for protecting society from unscrupulous criminals.  A Washington 
Evening Star editorial warned residents of the dangers lurking in the shadows of the 
nation’s capital, 
Now the police are hunting again for Mallory.  He is wanted for 
housebreaking and assaulting the daughter of a woman who had 
befriended him.  And this within 6 months after his release from jail.  The 
real point, it seems to us, is that the law, as it has been interpreted by the 
courts, is too heavily weighted on the side of the criminal.  The public, or 
society… is entitled to some consideration, too . . . [O]ne thing is certain – 
[Mallory] ought not to be roaming the streets of this city.  And as long as 
he and others like him are on the loose it would be well to keep the doors 
locked.39 
 
Congress, especially the Republicans and Southern Democrats who adopted positions in 
support of greater flexibility for law enforcement officers, and who were becoming 
increasingly agitated by the Court’s criminal procedure rulings, immediately began 
investigating ways to statutorily override the Supreme Court decision by revising Rule 
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
III. The Congressional Response to Mallory v. United States: Informing 
Criminal Suspects of their Rights. 
 
 Republicans and Southern Democrats responded to Mallory by considering 
legislation to revise Rule 5(a) so that it would apply the voluntariness standard to 
confessions. Representative Kenneth Keating (R-NY), who spearheaded the effort to 
revise the Mallory Rule, declared the need for greater clarity by announcing, 
                                                
39 Editorial, Lock Your Doors, WASH. EVENING STAR, Jan. 6, 1958.  
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The confusion among lawyers, the public, and the police as a result of this 
ruling on Federal arraignment procedures, should be cleared up without 
delay . . . Further delay invites peril for all our citizens.  The time to take 
the shackles off the police is upon us.  Legislation to revise the Mallory 
decision is absolutely necessary in order to protect our citizens from 
criminal elements in our society.  I hope the committee and then Congress 
as a whole will enact ameliorative legislation without further delay.40 
 
The fact that perceived criminals like Mallory were going free not only signaled to some 
members of Congress that law enforcement agencies needed more flexibility, but that 
something needed to be done to curb the Supreme Court.  There were members of 
Congress who wasted no time tying the rulings of the Court to other notoriously 
unpopular elements of society.  Representative Bill Cramer (R-FL), a prominent Southern 
Republican, declared, 
Many serious questions have arisen in recent years . . . [including] whether 
the Supreme Court was placing an unwarranted and unbalanced emphasis 
on the rights of the individual under our Constitution as compared to the 
collective rights of society or all of the people of the country to protection, 
specifically against criminals, Communists, and others who do violence to 
the public welfare and good.41  
 
When one member of Congress asked Representative Cramer whether it was appropriate 
for Congress to respond to the Court’s ruling, Cramer replied, 
I think it is the duty and the responsibility of Congress within its 
constitutional authority to review the decisions of the Supreme Court and 
its interpretations of the laws as passed by the Congress; also to make 
certain that the Supreme Court does not usurp the law-enactment authority 
and power of Congress, and that it is its duty to do so and its 
responsibility.  That is why I think the formation of this committee is 
timely under our constitutional powers and it should go forward with this 
work.42 
 
                                                
40 104 CONG. REC. 633–34 (1958) (statement of Rep. Keating). 
41 104 CONG. REC. 944–54 (1958) (statement of Rep. Kramer).  
42  Id. 
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Representative Cramer’s statement proved to be the beginning of a decades-long 
Congressional response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mallory, a response that a small 
number of passionate supporters of individual rights would creatively circumvent. 
While Republicans and Southern Democrats supported legislation to override the 
Mallory ruling, it was evident that others wanted to preserve or strengthen the Court’s 
ruling.  One of those members was Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR), a former law 
professor at the University of Oregon and a staunch libertarian on criminal procedure 
issues who led the fight against reversing the Supreme Court’s Mallory decision.  In 
response to the coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats who wanted Mallory 
overturned, Senator Morse responded, 
I wish to pay my respects to the United States Supreme Court, and thank 
God for it, because in these days, when hysteria so frequently stalks our 
country, it has become too common a practice to engage in attacks upon 
the United States Supreme Court and individual Justices because they live 
up to the sanctity of their robes and carry out their constitutional duty of 
rendering decisions in accordance with the Constitution as they interpret 
that Constitution on the basis of their legal research.43 
 
Senator Morse endorsed a different perspective for treating criminal suspects after taking 
them into custody.  This proposal included a clear announcement to the suspect of his or 
her right to counsel and a warning against self-incrimination.  He described his views of 
this relationship in the following way: 
“Interrogate or arrest him; but you are required, when you detain him, to 
notify him of his rights.  You are required to notify him that he is entitled 
to the benefits of counsel. You are required to notify him that anything he 
says can be used against him, and he is not under any obligation to say 
anything.”  The last point is quite important. Let me say by way of 
generality, subject to all the limitations of a generality, that confessions 
                                                
43 104 CONG. REC. 2549 (1958) (statement of Sen. Morse).  
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forced out of an arrested person are usually the technique of a lazy police 
department and a slovenly district attorney.44 
 
Nevertheless, conservatives in Congress maintained that law enforcement officers would 
be burdened by these requirements.   
These claims, however, were met with skepticism by the coalition led by Morse. 
The Morse coalition advocated professionalizing law enforcement officers so that when 
police agencies enforced the law, the officers would do so while faithfully obeying the 
Constitutional rights of criminal suspects. Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) put it 
this way: 
We hear this afternoon that the police have been unable to do their duty.  
The police can do their duty.  In the District of Columbia the police have 
not always been most inefficient.  Their methods are outmoded.  There is 
no school for the police.  There is no school to indicate the new police 
methods.  Maybe we do not appropriate enough money for that.45 
 
These early debates over the Mallory Rule demonstrate that immediately following the 
Court’s ruling, Republicans and Southern Democrats found common ground in 
supporting the legislative changes to the Mallory Rule to produce greater flexibility for 
federal law enforcement officers, including those in the District of Columbia.  On the 
other hand, Democrats, especially those in the northern states, concluded that valuing the 
efficiency of law enforcement agencies should not outweigh the pursuit of values like 
individual liberty and the due process rights of criminal suspects in the custody of law 
enforcement officers.  
                                                
44 Id. at 2552.  
45 104 CONG. REC. 12698 (1959) (statement of Rep. Celler).  
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These debates culminated in the drafting of legislation, the most prominent called 
the Willis-Keating Bill,46 to redefine the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 5(a). 
Rep. Edwin Willis (D-LA) included the following two provisions in H.R. 11477: 
(a) Evidence, including statements and confessions, otherwise admissible, shall not 
be inadmissible solely because of delay in taking an arrested person before a 
commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with 
offenses against the laws of the United States. 
 
(b) No statement, including a confession, made by an arrested person during an 
interrogation by a law-enforcement officer shall be admissible unless prior to such 
interrogation the arrested person had been advised that he is not required to make 
a statement and that any statement may be used against him. 
 
This bill received significant acclaim from Republicans, Southern Democrats, and even 
moderates.  During discussion of the bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator 
Joseph C. O’Mahoney (D-WY) proposed an amendment to change Part A of the bill to 
replace “delay” with “reasonable delay.”47  With little opposition, the amendment passed, 
although some of the senators wondered how the amendment differed from the present 
interpretation of the Mallory Rule.48  When the bill reached the full floor of the Senate it 
passed 65-12 in the same form as the bill reported out of the Judiciary Committee.49  In 
the meantime, the U.S. House overwhelmingly passed a bill that did not include the word, 
“reasonable” before “delay.”50  When both bills were assigned to a conference 
committee, the House and the Senate negotiators were at odds with one another because 
the House negotiators desired a bill weakening the Mallory Rule while the Senate 
                                                
46 H.R. 11477, 85th Cong. (2d Sess. 1958).  
47 Prearraignment Interrogation, supra note 26, at 1029.  
48 Murphy, supra note 37, at 195. 
49 Id. at 207.  
50 Id. at 219. 
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negotiators were split.51 After two days of negotiations, the conferees agreed to an 
amendment that recognized the following principles: 
that “reasonable delay” in arraignment would not of itself invalidate a 
confession obtained during such delay…that no confession or statement 
would be admissible unless prior to interrogation the suspect had been 
advised of his right to silence and warned that anything he said might be 
used in evidence…“that such delay is to be considered as an element in 
determining the voluntary or involuntary nature of such statements or 
confessions.”52  
 
Not all senators, however, were satisfied with the resulting bill. Some senators did not 
want a bill that returned “voluntariness” as a standard for judging the admissibility of 
confessions.  Senator Morse was committed to “talk[ing] this [bill] to death,” while 
Senator John Carroll (D-CO) focused on invoking a Senate rule that “forbade a 
conference to add new material to a bill.”53  Since this amendment was not agreed to in 
either the original House or Senate bills, then the conference bill fell under this rule.  If 
anyone invoked the Senate rule, the rule required the bill to be sent back to conference 
committee, but since this was all happening on the last day of the session before an 
election year, the likelihood of the bill making it to the Senate floor if the point of order 
was successful was low.54  With Congress on the verge of adjournment, Senator Carroll 
successfully raised a point of order that was sustained by Vice President Nixon and the 
bill was defeated.55  What is remarkable about the saga that ensued over the initial 
congressional response to the Mallory Rule was the ability of two senators to effectively 
obstruct the passage of legislation that was desired by a majority of lawmakers.  As a 
                                                
51 Id. at 219–220. 
52 Id. at 220.  
53 Id. at 220. 
54 Id. at 220.  
55 Prearraignment Interrogation, supra note 26, at 1030.  
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consequence, it was another year before Congress started over to alter the Mallory Rule 
with H.R. 4957.   
 The various perspectives of those supporting and opposing H.R. 4957 provide 
insight as to how lawmakers viewed the constitutional safeguards of those in custody at 
this later point in time.  Lawmakers who strongly supported permissive rules for the 
admission of evidence drafted legislative language informing suspects of the right to 
remain silent and the consequences of speaking to law enforcement officers.  The author 
of the bill,56 Rep. Willis, described it in the following way: 
This provision is deliberately intended as a protection of the rights of the 
accused.  It goes beyond the common practice in interrogating and taking 
the statement of an accused…Under the specific provisions of this 
proposal the arrested person would have to be advised that he is not 
required to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be 
used against him prior to the interrogation.  In short, this bill is intended to 
balance the rights of society and at the same time protect the rights of an 
accused.57     
 
Later, Rep. Willis was asked by Rep. Celler, an opponent of the bill, why there were no 
requirements to inform suspects that they also have the right to counsel.  Rep. Willis 
responded,  
We did not do that for the simple reason that there is no requirement at 
that point.  The right of counsel begins at time of arraignment…The right 
to counsel comes at the time of arraignment or at least preliminary hearing 
and that is the reason why it is not in the bill.58 
 
Despite the confidence of some members of Congress that H.R. 4957 sufficiently 
protected the rights of the accused, opponents criticized it for not including limits on the 
length of time suspects could be held in custody by authorities for questioning.  
                                                
 
57 105 CONG. REC. 12865 (1959) (statement of Rep. Willis).  
58 See id.  
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 Supporters of the bill, on the other hand, maintained that the proper standard for 
judging the admissibility of confessions was not the passage of time, but the 
voluntariness of the confession.  They also adopted a new strategy that required law 
enforcement officers to inform the accused of their rights upon their arrest. One supporter 
of this approach was Representative William McCulloch (R-OH), who explained the 
purpose of the bill from the perspective of those who supported it,  
The purpose of H.R. 4957 is to return the law to its commonly accepted 
interpretation prior to the Supreme Court’s decision.  H.R. 4957 will 
simply clarify [Mallory] by providing that the ‘evidence, including 
statements and confessions, shall not be inadmissible solely because of 
delay in taking an arrested person before a commissioner.’. . . The officer 
obtaining the confession is required to tell the accused that he does not 
have to make a statement and that, if he does, the statement may be used 
against him.59 
 
Another supporter of the bill was Rep. Cramer who explained in greater detail the 
purpose of the bill.  In explaining the legislation, Rep. Cramer said that the purpose of 
explaining these rights to those in the custody of law enforcement officers “is to provide 
adequate safeguards for the arrested individual.  The burden of proof is upon the 
Government to prove that these requirements have been met.”60  Opponents of the bill, 
however, remained opposed to the idea of giving law enforcement officers, rather than 
judges, responsibility for informing suspect of their rights.   
One member of Congress who came out forcefully against the obligations of law 
enforcement officers to deliver these warnings was Representative Alfred Santangelo (D-
NY).  He warned, 
                                                
59 105 CONG. REC. 12869 (1959) (statement of Rep. McCullough).  
60 105 CONG. REC. 12861–12889 (1959) (statement of Rep. Cramer).  
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The second subsection…is shortsighted.  It requires a law enforcement 
officer . . . to tell an arrested person that he is not required to make a 
statement. The net effect of section B is to require the police officer, as 
soon as he apprehends a person and places him under arrest, to advise, 
declare, and state to the person in words or in substance, ‘Mr. Mallory or 
Mr. Jones, you are not allowed to talk, and if you do make any statement, 
whatever you might say will be used against you.’  How many confessions 
do you think you will get under those circumstances?61 
 
This concern was shared by a number of other members of Congress.  One was 
Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI) who explained,  
[E]ven the proponents are forced to suggest in section [B] of the bill that 
the arresting officer must advise the defendant that he is not required to 
make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against 
him.  Therefore this bill presumes a delay of an undetermined period of 
time and insists that the police officer inform the defendant of one of his 
rights . . . He does not tell the defendant that he is entitled to counsel, does 
not inform him of the charge with which he is confronted.62 
 
In addition to the opposition from members of Congress who believed that suspects were 
not being informed of all of their rights, the experience under the Mallory Rule was not 
producing the dire criminal problems that were predicted immediately after the rule was 
announced by the Court. The Washington Post wrote an editorial expressing opposition 
to H.R. 4957, 
Policemen and prosecutors have learned to live with the Mallory rule.  
Their effectiveness in convicting the guilty has not been impaired; and the 
dire predictions that a horde of criminals would be loosed on the streets of 
the capital have not been realized.  The Willis-Keating bill passed by the 
House and pending in the Senate would operate however, to open the door 
to serious police trespasses on individual rights; and it would take away 
from the courts their one effective sanction against such trespasses.63 
  
                                                
61 105 CONG. REC. 12875 (1959) (statement of Rep. Santangelo).  
62 105 CONG. REC. 12877 (1959) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).  
63 105 CONG. REC. 15993–94 (1959) (statement of Sen. Keating).  
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In the end, H.R. 4957 did not receive the necessary support to replace the Mallory Rule .  
It was not until the mid-1960s that significant progress was made in overcoming the 
legislative obstructionism that became so prevalent during the post-Mallory debates.       
As the 1960s progressed, it became clear that Congress would not pass legislation 
to establish uniform procedures for the interrogation of criminal suspects because liberals 
wanted criminal suspects brought immediately before a magistrate to be informed of their 
rights, while conservatives wanted law enforcement officers to do so. The most progress 
occurred when the Justice Department weighed in on treatment of suspects who were in 
the custody of law enforcement officials. By 1964, the Justice Department supported 
informing those in custody of their right to remain silent and their right to consult an 
attorney.  At a hearing before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, Deputy 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark described the Justice Department’s position on the 
Mallory Rule and how it formulated policy with respect to interrogating criminal 
suspects.  After noting the importance of striking the delicate balance between the 
individual rights of suspects and the need to give flexibility to law enforcement, Clark 
testified, 
Under this [Justice Department] plan, after an arrest based upon probable 
cause and prior to the filing of a charge, a suspect may be questioned 
concerning his knowledge of a crime.  As a prerequisite to questioning he 
must be clearly advised that he need not answer any question, that any 
statement given may be used against him, that he may consult counsel, a 
relative, or a friend, and that if he is charged and cannot afford a lawyer 
the court will appoint one for him . . . [DC Metropolitan Police] Chief 
Layton and his staff have participated in the formulation of this procedure 
and fully concur in it.  The U.S. attorney believes that it will best serve his 
needs for the present.  It will be improved by detailed police regulations 
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based on experience, and can take into account the work of the American 
Law Institute and the American Bar Association as it becomes available.64   
 
In addition to the policy positions formulated at the Justice Department, the department’s 
U.S. Attorneys also weighed in on the issue.  In a letter written to the Chief of Police for 
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, U.S. Attorney David Acheson 
explained that a consensus was emerging in the federal district and circuit courts about 
the treatment of criminal suspects once taken into custody.  The U.S. Attorney described 
the type of announcement that should be adopted by Congress:  
Proposed Warning . . . You have been placed under arrest.  You are not 
required to say anything to us at any time or to answer any questions.  
Anything you say may be used as evidence in court . . . . You have a right 
to call a lawyer, relative, or friend.  He may be present here and you have 
a right to talk to him . . . If you cannot afford a lawyer, one may be 
appointed for you when you first go to court.65 
 
Although the Executive Branch made significant progress articulating a new legal 
policy for criminal suspects in custody of law enforcement officials, Senator Morse 
nevertheless maintained that it did not protect individual rights.  He spoke for a small 
group of senators who were primarily concerned with giving responsibility to individual 
law enforcement officers to explain to criminal suspects their rights. When the Justice 
Department supported specifying the rights of the accused under the Mallory Rule, Sen. 
Morse criticized the proposed policy by announcing, 
This is the Justice Department [sic] excuse and weak rationalization for 
scuttling the Mallory rule, in effect: 1. “A plain warning to the defendant, 
                                                
64 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on D.C. on Measures Relating to Crime and Crim. Proc. 
in D.C., 89th Cong. (1964) (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States Ramsey 
Clark); see also 111 CONG. REC. 17159 (1965).  
65 Hearings on H.R. 5688 and S. 1526 Before the S. Committee on the D.C., 89th Cong. 
498 (1965) (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States Ramsey Clark); see also 
111 CONG. REC. 17,159-60 (1965).  
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immediately in advance of the questioning, that he is not required to make 
any statement at any time and that any statement made by him may be 
used against him…What kind of protection is that, really? He has that 
right in any case; but that does not stop a brutal police department from 
browbeating him...Continuing with the reading of the recommendations: 2. 
“The arrested persons being afforded a reasonable opportunity to notify a 
relative or friend and consult with counsel of his own choosing.”  What a 
weak statement that is.  Time and time again the police will take 
advantage of the frightened, the timid, and the ignorant.  If it is all right to 
have a lawyer there, if it is all right to have a friend or a member of the 
family there, what is wrong with just taking the arrested person before a 
committing magistrate?  The court said that should be done.66 
 
Besides opposition from the liberal wing of Congress, news outlets also became 
concerned about allowing police officers to inform suspects of their rights.  The 
Washington Post published an editorial supporting the view of the Morse coalition by 
announcing, 
Being advised of one’s rights by a policeman is not at all the same thing as 
being advised of one’s rights by a judge.  And the insertion of the phrase 
“when reasonably possible” in connection with the interrogation of a 
defendant makes the promised protection meaningless.  This kind of 
corner cutting neither curbs crime nor enhances respect for the law.67 
 
It was not until 1966 that the congressional stalemate over the admissibility of 
confessions was resolved when another formal institutional player weighed in on the 
issue – the U.S. Supreme Court.   
 In 1966, the Warren Court drastically changed the nature of American 
interrogation law in its landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona.68  The Court began by 
outlining and describing abusive police practices, including widespread use of the “third 
                                                
66 110 CONG. REC. 7,438–63 (1964) (statement of Sen. Morse).  
 
67 See 110 CONG. REC. 7456 (1964) (statement of Sen. Morse). 
68 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
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degree.”69  Further, and perhaps more importantly, the Court stressed that the “modern 
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented.”70  
This was of particular concern because custodial interrogations take place in privacy, 
allowing law enforcement officers to exploit certain factors or sensitive areas of the 
suspect’s personality.71  Therefore, “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third 
degree’ or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial 
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals.”72   
 With all of this in mind, the Miranda Court found that “without proper safeguards 
the process of [custodial interrogation] contains inherently compelling pressures which 
work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.”73  Accordingly, the Court formulated specific 
safeguards for any custodial interrogation:  
 [W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
 by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the  
 privilege against self incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be 
 employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are 
 adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise 
                                                
69 Id. at 445–47. The Court discussed the “famous Wickersham Report to Congress by a 
Presidential Commission . . . and a series of cases decided by [the] Court after these 
studies, [to show that] the police resorted to physical brutality—beatings, hanging, 
whipping—and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort 
confessions.”  See id. at 445 n.5 (citing IV NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931)). The Court 
continued that these practices remained “sufficiently widespread to be the object of 
concern” and saw no assurance that the practices would cease in the future. Id. at 447.  
70 Id. at 447. 
71 See id. (discussing interrogation techniques).  
72 Id. at 455 n.24. The Court also noted that modern interrogation practices increased the 
risk of a false or otherwise unreliable confession.  
73 Id. at 467.  
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 of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He 
 must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, 
 that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the 
 right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one 
 will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.74  
 
The Court’s authoritative decision set into motion another series of interactions between 
the Courts, Congress, and the Executive Branch over the proper balance to be struck 
when processing criminal suspects through the criminal justice system. 
IV. The Congressional Backlash in the Wake of the Miranda Decision. 
 
Congress’s response to Miranda v. Arizona was forceful. Blaming Miranda and 
the Supreme Court for the increase of crime in the United States became a popular 
pastime among legislators.  It became commonplace for legislators to propose legislation 
to overturn the landmark ruling.  Some members of Congress began using omnibus crime 
bills as a vehicle to overturn the Miranda decision.  By devoting a section of these bills to 
overturning Miranda, some members of Congress who disagreed with overturning 
Miranda were guaranteed to vote for it because they agreed with another part of the bill, 
especially sections that devoted block grants to cash-poor law enforcement agencies. 
 Still, not all senators were so easily persuaded to support one of the first crime 
bills drafted in the wake of the Miranda decision, and neither was the Johnson 
Administration who vetoed those measures. Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY), for 
instance, opposed the measure, stating: 
I have carefully studied the omnibus crime bill [H.R. 5688]…I regret that I 
cannot support this bill as it is presently drafted because of the provisions . 
. .  that deal with the arrest, the detention, and interrogation of criminal 
                                                
74 Id. at 478–79.  
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suspects.  In my judgment, these provisions are unclear in their scope and 
subject to police abuse.  The threat they pose to the civil liberties of this 
city’s citizenry cannot be taken lightly.”75 
 
The head of the Justice Department, Attorney General Ramsey Clark, agreed with 
Kennedy because Clark believed that the bill “contained some very repressive and . . . 
several unconstitutional features.”76   
Crime bills were not the only response to the Supreme Court’s decisions.  In 
addition to the Omnibus Crime Control Bill, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) proposed a 
constitutional amendment to overturn Miranda.  Although he gathered little support, Sen. 
Ervin nevertheless proposed stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in cases 
involving voluntary confessions.  This bill, S. 1194, which later became part of the 
proposed Omnibus Crime Control Bill of 1968, stated, 
Neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior court ordained and established 
by the Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States 
shall have jurisdiction to review or to reverse, vacate, modify, or disturb in 
any way, a ruling of any trial court of any State in any criminal 
prosecution admitting in evidence as voluntarily made any admission or 
confession of an accused if such ruling has been affirmed or otherwise 
upheld by the highest court of the Sate having appellate jurisdiction of the 
cause.77   
 
However, there was little agreement about the constitutionality of stripping the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction to hear these cases.  When Congress debated altering the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968, Senator John 
McClellan (D-AR) argued that there was historical precedent for altering the Court’s 
jurisdiction dating back to the Civil War and that was “clearly enunciated in Ex Parte 
                                                
75 112 CONG. REC. 27,291–92 (1966) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
76 ALEXANDER WOHL, FATHER, SON, AND CONSTITUTION: HOW JUSTICE TOM CLARK AND 
ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK SHAPED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 323 (2013). 
77 S. 1194, 90th Cong. (1968); see also 113 CONG. REC. 5578 (1967).  
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McCardle.”78  In response, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) also supported stripping the 
Court of jurisdiction and argued that Congress wielded the institutional power to alter the 
Court’s jurisdiction in the area of voluntary confessions because “Article III, Section 2 
sets up the authority for Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the Court in any field 
Congress wishes.”79 Senator Sam Ervin agreed, saying, “The good and wise men who 
drafted the Constitution could not have used plainer words than those; and those words 
state in unmistakable language that Congress has the constitutional power to define the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”80  These proposals eventually became part 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which was designed to deal with the 
issue of crime through greater law enforcement assistance to the states. 
Meanwhile, the Johnson Administration wanted to see the Omnibus Crime Bill 
passed quickly with a presidential election less than one year away.  One New York Times 
article reported, 
A majority of the Senate is reported to favor the President’s bill and the 
White House is said to be anxious that it pass soon so that the money can 
reach local police departments before next summer, partly because crime 
and civil disorder are expected to be a prime issue in the Presidential 
campaign.81 
 
While most everyone agreed that law enforcement assistance was needed in the states, 
not everyone agreed that altering the Court’s jurisdiction would withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  The Attorney General prepared a statement about the constitutionality of the 
                                                
78 114 CONG. REC. 11,200–232 (1968) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (citing Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868)).  
79 See 114 CONG. REC. 11,610–619 (1968) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).  
80 114 CONG. REC. 12,458 (1968) (statement of Sen. Ervin).  
81 113 CONG. REC. 34,010 (1967). 
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section that altered the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether confessions could be 
admitted into evidence: 
The Department of Justice considers this legislation of doubtful 
constitutional validity . . . I must say that I find [Section 3502] the most 
repugnant section of the whole bill.  Section 3502 of title II abolishes the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other Federal courts to review a 
State court determination admitting a confession in evidence as voluntarily 
made.82 
 
While a number of congressmen supported altering the court’s jurisdiction fair game, 
several others members disagreed.  Senator Joseph Tydings (D-MD) was one of those 
members of Congress, who argued, 
[T]he arbitrary carving of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
with the clear motive of overruling specific court decisions such as 
Marbury against Madison and Martin against Hunter’s Lessee; the blatant 
attempt to amend the Constitution by a simple legislative enactment—all 
of these provisions are fundamentally inconsistent with the roots of our 
tradition of respect for individual liberty, and reliance on an independent 
judiciary to protect our liberties.83 
 
Republicans were not altogether of one mind about the proper way of responding to the 
Court’s ruling in Miranda, either.   
One Republican who disagreed with altering the court’s jurisdiction to preclude 
review of voluntary confessions was Senator Hiram Fong (R-HI), who argued, 
The Supreme Court is the only tribunal provided by the Constitution to 
resolve inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of Federal law by State 
and Federal courts, and to maintain the supremacy of Federal law against 
conflicting State law.  To deny the power of ultimate resolution by the 
Supreme Court in any area is to nullify the principal instrument for 
implementing the Supremacy Clause in our constitutional system.84 
 
                                                
82 114 CONG. REC. 11,596 (1968) (statement of Att’y Gen.); see also S. REP. NO. 90–1097 
(1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 
83 114 CONG. REC. 11,891 (1968) (statement of Sen. Tydings).  
84 114 CONG. REC. 12,293 (1968) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
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Senator Stephen Young (D-OH) also doubted the constitutionality of the bill and was 
concerned that the U.S. Supreme Court was under attack by Congress.  He declared,  
I could not in good conscience vote for this bill unless such proposals and 
provisions are eliminated altogether.  They present a grave threat to the 
basic principles on which our Nation was founded—to our basic concept 
of separation of powers, to Federal supremacy, to judicial independence, 
in short, to our most cherished ideas of justice and the rule of law.85 
 
The legal community also stepped up the pressure by becoming more involved in 
opposing legislation that altered the court’s jurisdiction.  The New York City Bar 
Association’s Committee on Civil Rights and Federal Legislation adopted a statement to 
that end, 
We deplore this proposal as exceedingly unwise and, beyond that, we 
believe that it raises grave constitutional issues.  We most strongly urge 
that the Senate reject Title II.  Our opposition is based on our conclusions 
that: as a matter of technique, the legislation represents a blatant assault on 
the federal judiciary constituting a misuse of whatever power Congress 
may possess over its jurisdiction.86 
 
The opposition to stripping the Court’s jurisdiction was enough to defeat the proposal, 
but it left the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act largely intact, including 
Section 3501 that “replaced” the Miranda ruling with the pre-Miranda voluntariness 
standard.     
 While Congress responded to Miranda by successfully passing legislation to 
overturn it, Nixon continued to use the Miranda ruling to his electoral advantage. He 
understood that a strategic response to Miranda entailed consideration of the southern 
states’ growing discontent over the Warren Court’s liberal rulings in the area of criminal 
                                                
85 114 CONG. REC. 12,925 (1968) (statement of Sen. Young).  
86 114 CONG. REC. 14,163 (1968). 
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procedure.87  This may explain the Nixon Administration’s refusal to recognize the pre-
Miranda voluntariness test articulated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, and instead to recognize Miranda as a legitimate law enforcement policy.  
Nevertheless, Nixon recognized an electoral opportunity to reach out to southern states 
by appointing “strict constructionists” who were wholly different than the pro-defendant 
Justices who sided with Chief Justice Warren in Miranda.88   
 In pursuit of this strategy, Nixon successfully appointed William Rehnquist and 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, both of whom were instrumental in shaping the Miranda 
doctrine and signaled greater respect for the law enforcement community over the 
criminally accused.  Burger became Chief Justice in 1969, three years after Miranda.89 
Nixon believed Burger would be a reliable “law-and-order” justice, rather than 
sympathetic to the plight of criminal suspects,90 and his past record was enough to ease 
the concerns of conservatives who worried that he would be another Earl Warren clone. 
A Washington Post article written by John MacKenzie described why Nixon considered 
Burger to be a good choice for Chief Justice.  He wrote,  
                                                
87 See KEVIN M. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM 
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (2011).  
88 Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 
975–76 (2012) [hereinafter Kamisar, Rise, Decline, and Fall] (citing RICHARD M. NIXON, 
TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1968), available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xfe16b00/pdf;jsessionid=B3108BC30B410939156F8DC
F38F2F114.tobacco). 
89 Warren E. Burger, 1969–1986, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_burger.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  
90 See Kamisar, Rise, Decline, and Fall, supra note 88, at 976 (citing SETH STERN & 
STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 244 (2010)). Prior to 
becoming Chief Justice, Judge Burger was the principle antagonist of the liberal judges 
on his own court. President Nixon believed this trend would continue if Judge Burger 
became Chief Justice. See id. at 976–78. 
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Burger is a veteran of combat over the use of incriminating statements 
obtained illegally from suspects in police custody.  He labored in the court 
of appeals to limit the impact of the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision 
Mallory v. United States, a forerunner of Miranda.  Over a dissenters’ 
protest that the result was ‘monstrous,’ Burger held that illegally obtained 
statements, which could not be used the prosecutor’s basic case, may be 
used to discredit the testimony of a defendant who takes the stand.  In the 
course of a brief opinion, Burger cast doubt on the court’s policy, dating 
back 50 years and more, of excluding evidence that authorities have 
obtained illegally.91 
 
President Nixon nominated William Rehnquist for similar reasons, whose legal 
background revealed a deep skepticism about the Supreme Court’s decisions on police 
interrogations and confessions.  For example, while Rehnquist headed the Office of Legal 
Counsel, he sent an internal memo maintaining that “there is reason to believe” the 
Miranda decision favored criminals and advocated the creation of a national presidential 
commission “to determine whether the overriding public interest in law enforcement 
requires a constitutional amendment.”92    
 President Nixon’s belief that Justices Burger and Rehnquist would alleviate the 
effects of Miranda proved true in some way. Chief Justice Burger dealt the first major 
blow to Miranda in Harris v. New York.93  In Harris, the Court held that the “shield 
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a 
defense,” and that law enforcement could impeach a criminal defendant with un-
                                                
91 See John P. MacKenzie, Precedent-Upsetting Ruling Give Court a Nixon Stamp, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1971, at A2; see also 117 CONG. REC. 7833 (1971). 
92 Yale Kamisar, Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared the Landmark Confession 
Case, but Weakened Its Impact, 92 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (2006) (quoting Memorandum from 
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John W. Dean 
III, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Apr. 1, 1969)). According to now-author John W. Dean 
III, the memorandum was marked “administratively confidential” and the Department of 
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12–13 (2001).  
93 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).  
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Mirandized statements in cases where the defendant took the stand in his own defense.94   
Justice Rehnquist scored another victory for law enforcement in Michigan v. Tucker, by 
allowing the testimony of a witness whose identity was revealed through un-warned 
statements given by a suspect into evidence. 95  Together, Chief Justices Burger and 
Rehnquist were harsh critics of Miranda, and Rehnquist stated that the Court “repeatedly 
referred to the Miranda warnings as prophylactic, and not themselves rights protected by 
the Constitution[.]”96  In fact, Justice Rehnquist penned the majority opinion that devised 
the Public Safety Exception, but a number of other important cases created the 
momentum needed for carving out these exceptions to the rule.97  
V. The Contours of the Miranda Doctrine 
 The Miranda decision spawned an extensive array of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence defining its requirements and limitations. First, police are not required to 
repeat the warnings prescribed by Miranda verbatim.  Rather, Miranda has been satisfied 
in case law so long as the words chosen by law enforcement “reasonably convey” to a 
suspect his or her rights.98  Police are not required to apprise a suspect of the specific 
subject matter to be discussed; rather, they need only convey a suspect’s constitutional 
rights.99  Nonetheless, police must ensure that the warnings given are reasonably 
                                                
94 Id. at 226.  
95 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).  
96 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–38 (2000).  
97 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). For a more in-depth analysis of 
the effect that Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist had on the Miranda doctrine, see 
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99 
(1977); see also DEAN, supra note 92. 
98 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.195 (1989).  
99 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).  
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effective- the Court has excluded confessions where Miranda warnings were given “mid-
stream” or as part of a deliberate, “two-step” process to avoid giving meaningful Miranda 
warnings.100 
 Second, the warnings are only required where a suspect is both “in custody” and 
subject to “custodial interrogation.”  These phrases have spawned complex legal 
doctrines of their own.  In determining whether an individual is in custody, courts must 
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine how a hypothetical, reasonable 
person would perceive his or her own circumstances—if a reasonable person would not 
feel free to leave, then that person is in custody for Miranda purposes.101  Whether a 
suspect has been “interrogated” for the purposes of Miranda requires an analysis from the 
perspective of the police, and asks whether direct questioning or its functional equivalent 
were “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”102  Chiefly, interrogation for 
the purposes of Miranda requires that questioning come from the police, meaning 
questions posed by a third-party need not be preceded by warnings.103  This rule usually 
applies even if the police are nearby or listening to the conversation.104  Additionally, a 
criminal suspect’s Miranda rights cannot be invoked in anticipation of being in custody 
or subject to custodial interrogation.  Instead, both elements—“custody” and “subject to 
                                                
100 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).  
101 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). But see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that a routine traffic stop does, in fact, automatically result in 
“custody” for the purposes of Miranda, because such an occurrence does not give rise to 
the inherently compelling pressures contemplated by Miranda).  
102 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).  
103 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164–65 (1986).  
104 See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).  
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interrogation”—must be satisfied before an invocation of Miranda rights is considered 
valid.105 
 Third, invocation of one’s Miranda rights is no simple task.  Invocation of the 
right to silence requires an affirmative, unambiguous statement indicating an intent to 
remain silent.106  Even so, successful invocation of the right to silence provides short-
lived protection: so long as police “scrupulously honor” the suspect’s invocation of the 
right to silence, Miranda does not forbid a subsequent attempt to interrogate the suspect 
later that day.107  Invocation of the right to counsel similarly requires an unambiguous 
statement, and successful invocation requires the police to refrain from “re-interrogation” 
until the suspect has a lawyer present or until the suspect reinitiates the interrogation on 
his own.108  Further, ambiguous statements need not be followed by a clarifying question 
from the police.  Therefore, the interrogation may proceed until a suspect clearly 
                                                
105 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); see also Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 
26 (2011).  
 
106 Berghuis v Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
 
107 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975) (holding that second interrogation 
attempt about a different crime two hours after invocation of the right to silence did not 
offend Miranda because suspect’s invocation or right to silence was “fully respected”). 
The Mosley Court involved a second interrogation about a different crime, and the Court 
has not decided whether the police may attempt a second interrogation regarding the 
same crime. However, most lower courts have held that Mosley’s permissive “re-
interrogation” rule applies to interrogations regarding the same crime. See, e.g., Weeks v. 
Angelone, 176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the mere fact that a second 
interrogation involves the same crime as the first interrogation does not necessarily 
render a confession derived from the second interrogation unconstitutionally invalid 
under Mosley.”). 
 
108 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  
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indicates a desire for counsel.109  Comparatively, however, an expressed intent to remain 
silent provides considerably more protection than invocation of the right to counsel 
because police may not attempt re-interrogation on any matter, even if the suspect has 
had a chance to consult with counsel.110  This protection continues unless the suspect 
reinitiates the police interrogation,111 or there has been a significant “break in custody.”112  
A “break in custody” sufficient to allow re-interrogation occurs where a suspect has been 
released from Miranda custody for at least two weeks.113  Where a suspect is already 
incarcerated pursuant to a prior conviction, a break in custody can occur if the suspect is 
permitted to return to “his normal life,” meaning his cell or the general prison 
population.114   
 The Miranda doctrine’s exclusionary rule is a particularly weak exclusionary rule 
in comparison to other constitutional protections.  Where a confession is taken pursuant 
to an improper interrogation, the confession can be used to impeach the defendant’s 
credibility should he elect to take the stand in his own defense.115  Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, any physical evidence or witnesses derivatively discovered from the 
illegal interrogation are admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.116  This is in 
contrast to, for example, violations of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
                                                
109 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).  
110 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).  
111 See Edwards, 451 U.S. 477.  
112 Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).  
113 Id. at 110–11 (reasoning that two weeks is enough time to alleviate the coercive 
effects of a custodial interrogation, and enough time to “seek advice from an attorney, 
family members, and friends”).  
114 Id. at 114.  
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unreasonable search and seizure, which require law enforcement to show that the 
evidence is not “tainted” by an earlier violation in order for the evidence to be 
admissible.117  Thus, Miranda’s exclusionary rule is weaker because the prosecution is 
not required to make this affirmative showing.  
 The Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to Miranda, meaning the 
warnings do not apply even if a suspect is in custody and questioned by police.  For 
example, Miranda warnings are not required before the police ask “routine booking 
questions,” meaning questions reasonably necessary to secure the biographical data 
needed to complete booking or pretrial services.118  Warnings are also not required where 
the police use a secret agent to interrogate a criminal suspect.  Miranda contemplated 
pressures emanating from the police toward the suspect, pressures that are not implicated 
when the suspect is unaware of police involvement.119  Finally, and most relevantly, the 
Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, created an exception to Miranda for questions 
“reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety” in New York v. Quarles.120 
VI.  Creation and Application of the Public Safety Exception 
 The Public Safety Exception categorically exempts certain questioning from 
Miranda’s warning requirements.  Therefore, responses to questions asked pursuant to 
the Public Safety Exception are admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief because 
Miranda’s exclusionary rules do not apply.  However, statements that are coerced within 
                                                
117 See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601–02 (1975) (holding that the prosecution 
bears the burden of proving that the “causal chain” between an illegal arrest and 
subsequent statements has been broken).  
118 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).  
119 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).  
120 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).  
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the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause are not 
admissible for any purpose, regardless of whether the Public Safety Exception applies.121  
A. Creation of the Public Safety Exception: New York v. Quarles.  
 The Public Safety Exception to Miranda was created in 1984, when the United 
States Supreme Court held that Benjamin Quarles’ unwarned statements taken after an 
incident in a New York City supermarket were admissible at his trial.122  In Quarles, the 
police pursued a suspect after a rape victim, shortly after being attacked, provided the 
police with a detailed description of her attacker, his location, and his possession of a 
gun.123  After cornering Quarles in a supermarket minutes later, an officer noticed 
Quarles’ empty holster and asked him about the location of the gun.124  In response, 
Quarles told the officer, “the gun is over there.”125 
 A technical reading of Miranda would warrant application of a “presumption of 
coercion,” followed by exclusion of the statements concerning the location of the gun.  
Therefore, strict adherence to Miranda would have compelled the Court to conclude that 
Quarles should have received warnings.  He was in the custody of the police after being 
“cornered,” and asking about the location of a gun used during the commission of a 
                                                
121 See, e.g., State v. Leone, 581 A.2d 394, 397–98 (Me. 1990) (upholding suppression of 
statements taken after officers slammed the suspect’s head into the ground and threatened 
to kill him with a service revolver, but admitting other statements taken in response to 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety after finding they were 
voluntarily given).  
122 See generally Quarles, 467 U.S. 649.  
123 Id. at 651–52.  
124 Id. at 652. 
125 Id.  
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violent crime was clearly “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”126  In 
fact, this was the conclusion reached by a majority of judges on New York’s highest 
court.  The New York Court of Appeals, accordingly, held that Quarles’ response 
occurred while in custody and “before he had been given the preinterrogation warnings to 
which he was constitutionally entitled.”127  Further, without expressly recognizing or 
rejecting a public safety exception to Miranda, the New York high court found that 
“there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing 
a risk to the public safety or that the police interrogation was prompted by any such 
concern.”128  Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals held that the lower courts 
properly suppressed Quarles’ statement about the location of the gun.129   
 In dissent, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals Sol Wachtler argued 
that Quarles’ statements could be admitted without violating Miranda.  Chief Judge 
Wachlter believed that under the circumstances before the court, strict adherence to 
Miranda “would only unnecessarily enhance the potential for death or serious injury.”130  
Further, careful analysis of Miranda and Innis131 revealed that the Court was primarily 
concerned with law enforcement conduct that “reveals an unmistakably deliberate 
attempt to elicit some incriminating response from the detainee as opposed to official 
conduct designed to achieve an articulable and legitimate noninvestigatory purpose.”132  
                                                
126 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); see also Stansbury v. California, 
511 U.S. 318 (1994). 
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In Judge Wachtler’s view, attempts to protect both officers and the public constituted 
such a purpose, and failing to carve out a public safety exception to Miranda was 
“contrary to reason and binding precedent.”133   
 The United States Supreme Court agreed with Judge Wachtler’s dissenting 
opinion.  In writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found Quarles’ response —“the 
gun is over there”—admissible, citing “overriding considerations of public safety.”134  
The Court found that under these circumstances Miranda would place police in the 
“untenable position” of choosing between protecting the public and securing statements 
that would be admissible in court.135  The Court resolved these conflicting objectives in 
favor of law enforcement, finding “that the need for answers to questions in a situation 
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting 
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”136  
 The majority sympathized with police officers forced to make quick decisions in 
attempts to gain control of volatile situations.  Justice Rehnquist explained the 
“importance of a workable rule to guide police officers, who have only limited time and 
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
circumstances they confront.”137  The Public Safety Exception, according to the Court, 
would lessen the necessity of the on-the-scene balancing process described above, and 
                                                
133 Id. at 671 (Watchler, J., dissenting).  
134 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).  
135 Id. at 657.  
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would “not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case it will be 
circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.”138   
 The Court alluded to this confidence in law enforcement by placing great faith in 
the ability of police officers to determine when the exception applies: “We think police 
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to 
secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit 
testimonial evidence from a suspect.”139  In sum, the Quarles Court held that Miranda 
does not require warnings in “a situation in which police officers ask questions 
reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety,” regardless of the motivation of 
individual officers.140   
 In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that “the policies underlying the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination are not diminished simply because 
testimony is compelled to protect the public's safety.”141  Because he considered Quarles’ 
statement “compelled,” the Fifth Amendment posed an “absolute prohibition” that could 
not be eluded by the majority “in such an ad hoc manner, [otherwise] the Bill of Rights 
would be a most unreliable protector of individual liberties.”142  
 In applying the specific facts pertaining to the pursuit and arrest of Benjamin 
Quarles, the majority found that the police “were confronted with the immediate 
necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe 
the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the 
                                                
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 658–59.  
140 Id. at 657.  
141 Id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
142 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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supermarket.”143  The officer’s questioning of the suspect regarding the location of the 
gun, therefore, was objectively reasonable because it “obviously posed more than one 
danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee 
might later come upon it.”144  Therefore, the Court’s newly minted exception to Miranda 
applied, and Quarles’ statements were improperly suppressed. 
B. Reconciling Quarles with Dickerson.  
 In 2000, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to overturn the Miranda ruling 
once and for all.  In Dickerson v. United States, the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the part of the Omnibus Crime Bill in 1968 that articulated 
the voluntariness standard, was unconstitutional because “Miranda announced a 
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”145  The most surprising 
component of Dickerson was its author, since Justice Rehnquist had been one of 
Miranda’s harshest critics since its establishment in 1966.  The Court declined to 
overturn Miranda because the decision “has become embedded in routine police practice 
to the point where the warnings have become embedded in our national culture [and] . . . 
wide acceptance in the legal culture . . . is adequate reason not to overrule it.”146  Finally, 
principles of stare decisis “weigh heavily against overruling” Miranda.147   
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 The Court addressed Quarles directly, finding that the Public Safety Exception 
was merely an illustration of the principle that “no constitutional rule is immutable.”148  
Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that in some cases the Miranda doctrine had been 
expanded, rather than eroded.149  According to the Court, Miranda had announced a 
general rule that was subject to expansion and retraction based on the “various 
circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modification 
represented by [cases like Quarles] are as much as normal part of constitutional law as 
the original decision.”150 
 Finally, the Dickerson Court noted that although Miranda itself invited alternative 
legislative action to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
Congress must adopt measures “at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their 
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”151  Therefore, 
supplanting Miranda’s warnings with the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” test—which is 
what §3501 purported to do—was impermissible and in violation of Miranda’s 
“constitutionally based” rule.152 
                                                
148 Id. at 441.  
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152 Id. The “voluntariness” test provided by section 3501 clearly fell below the floor 
provided by Miranda. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). However, some 
law professors argue that Miranda never lived up to the protections envisioned by the 
Warren Court. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
1519 (2008) (arguing that modern application of the Miranda doctrine fails to provide the 
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VII.  Lower Court Application of the Quarles Public Safety Exception. 
 The Quarles decision is the only instance in which the United States Supreme 
Court has directly applied the Public Safety Exception.  Accordingly, lower federal and 
state courts have been free to decide whether Quarles should be limited to its own facts 
or applied more broadly.  While most courts have chosen the latter—electing to apply 
Public Safety Exception in a variety of situations—the Public Safety Exception is most 
often applied to factual situations similar to Quarles itself.153  Although only a small 
number of courts have decided Public Safety Exception issues involving explosives, such 
as those used in the Boston Marathon bombing, most have found that explosives present 
special circumstances that warrant even broader application of the Public Safety 
Exception.154  
                                                
153 See infra Part VII.A. 
154 See infra Part VII.B. 
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A. General Trends in Application of the Public Safety Exception. 155 
 
 This Part of our article primarily focuses on the manner in which federal courts 
apply the Public Safety Exception, because the FBI will conduct most terrorist 
interrogations.156  However, some state court opinions are incorporated to demonstrate 
the variety of rationales employed by American courts since Quarles.  
 In the majority of cases—approximately 83%—where a court elects to apply the 
Public Safety Exception, the threat to public safety is a missing or discarded firearm.157  
                                                
155 Our research methodology is borrowed from Joanna Wright, author of a law review 
note about the Public Safety Exception. See Joanna Wright, Mirandizing Terrorists? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (2011). 
 
Ms. Wright aggregated data about the Public Safety Exception by analyzing every court 
decision in which courts applied the Public Safety Exception from 1984 (when Quarles 
was decided) to October 4, 2011. Her research focused on opinions that “provide[d] a 
clear, definite statement on the court’s [Public Safety Exception] approach. . . . [and 
omitted] cases lacking clear statements regarding the appropriate application of the 
Public Safety Exception.” Id. at 1313. As of October 2011, according to Ms. Wright’s 
research, in 267 out of 322 (or 83% of) cases involving application of the Public Safety 
Exception, a firearm was the threat to public safety. Id. at 1320.  
 
We attempted to mirror Ms. Wright’s research methodology, which involved a 
straightforward WestlawNext search of all federal and state cases using the search terms  
[“Public Safety Exception” and suppress! and Quarles], while filtering out decisions after 
October 4, 2011 (the cut-off date for Ms. Wright’s Note). Id. at 1311 n.75. This modified 
search yielded 73 decisions, 54 of them from federal courts. Of these 54 decisions, 
approximately 36 provided the “clear, definite statement” concerning the court’s 
approach employed by Ms. Wright. Unless otherwise specified, references to percentages 
represent a combination of my research with Ms. Wright’s, in order to provide a more 
comprehensive overview of Quarles’ application from 1984 to 2013. 
 
156 See Anne E. Kornblut, New Unit to Question Key Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug. 
24, 2009, at A1 (reporting that FBI's newly created “High Value Detainee Interrogation 
Group” is charged with interrogated key suspected terrorists). 
157 See Wright, supra note 155, at 1320. Our research similarly indicates that since 
October 4, 2011, 79% of federal courts that have applied the Public Safety Exception 
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Often the police are pursuing a known suspect or searching for an individual based upon 
some description of the suspect only hours after a crime has been committed.158  Law 
enforcement typically bases its belief that a firearm was used or discarded on several 
forms of evidence, including whether the victim or witness reported the use of a firearm, 
the officers observed the suspect dispose of a firearm or other object during the pursuit, 
the suspect had firearm paraphernalia on his or her person, or the suspect had a history of 
violent criminal activity.159  Upon successful apprehension or detention of the suspect, 
questions falling under the Public Safety Exception have three broad goals: learning the 
location of the discarded firearm, whether the firearm is loaded, and whether the suspect 
has any other weapons on his person or in a location where a third-party could access and 
use the weapon.160  
 Courts have split on the importance of a firearm in deciding whether to apply the 
Public Safety Exception.  In United States v. Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that where a 
firearm is involved, officers must “have reason to believe (1) that the defendant might 
have (or recently have had) a weapon; and (2) that someone other than police might gain 
access to that weapon and inflict harm.”161  However, other courts have found that the 
Public Safety Exception applies beyond the immediate moments after an arrest, on the 
grounds that the threat of a missing or discarded firearm “does not dissipate over 
                                                                                                                                            
identified a firearm as the threat to public safety. In incorporating our research with Ms. 
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159 See id.  
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time.”162  However, other courts have found that even where a firearm was involved in 
the commission of the crime, the Public Safety Exception will not apply if law 
enforcement has gained control over the suspect or situation in general.163  
 Courts have admitted evidence pursuant to the Public Safety Exception in a broad 
range of circumstances where there is a threat to officer safety or health.  In United States 
v. Talley, the Sixth Circuit held that Public Safety Exception questioning is permissible 
when “officers have a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that they are in 
danger.”164  Other circuits have found that the Public Safety Exception applies where an 
officer’s future health is at issue, thus broadening the Public Safety Exception to 
circumstances beyond immediate injury caused by a weapon.  For example, in United 
States v. Carrillo, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s response to an officer’s 
unwarned inquiry into whether the defendant had any sharp needles or objects on his 
person was admissible under the Public Safety Exception.165  The court reasoned that 
even though a weapon was not directly involved, the officer acted objectively reasonable 
because he had been scratched during previous searches and suffered from headaches and 
skin irritations.166 
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blood test after being bitten by the suspect fell within the Public Safety Exception, 
because officer had an objectively reasonable fear that he might have contracted AIDS 
from the bite, and was entitled to information concerning whether he should undergo 
prompt medical treatment to avoid infecting others).  
166 Carillo, 16 F.3d 1046. 
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 Several federal courts have found that, where a suspect requests counsel, the 
Public Safety Exception is still applicable if officers reasonably believe there is a threat to 
public safety.  The central justification for this rule is that the danger to the public is the 
same whether or not a suspect has requested an attorney.167  However, the Public Safety 
Exception is not an exception to the Fifth Amendment itself, just to Miranda’s 
“prophylactic” rule, meaning officers may not use violent or coercive tactics to elicit a 
confession from a suspect.168  
 In sum, the vast majority of Public Safety Exception cases involve fact patterns 
similar to Quarles itself.  It is unclear whether this is a product of the judiciary’s desire to 
stay faithful to the policy announced in Quarles itself by limiting application of the 
Public Safety Exception to cases with similar facts, or because law enforcement has 
simply chosen to limit invocation of the Public Safety Exception to cases where a firearm 
is involved for fear that the judiciary will limit its application to cases with facts similar 
to Quarles.  However, as we demonstrate later in this article, in cases involving a bomb 
or other explosive, courts have been more willing to apply the Public Safety Exception 
because those types of weapons are less stable and potentially involve greater loss of life.  
B. How Do Federal Courts Analyze the Public Safety Exception in the Context 
of “Terrorist Scenarios”?   
 
 American courts have only decided two cases involving circumstances similar to 
the interrogation of the surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect.  However, the 
                                                
167 See United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).  
168 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).  
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Public Safety Exception has been invoked in two high-profile attempted terrorism 
scenarios under circumstances similar to the Boston Marathon Bombing.  On Christmas 
Day in 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the “Christmas Day Bomber”) was 
apprehended after an unsuccessful attempt to detonate a bomb on a flight from 
Amsterdam to London.169 After an hour of interrogation by the FBI and without being 
read his Miranda rights, Abdulmutallab confessed and made numerous other 
incriminating statements.170 Similarly, in 2010, Faisal Shahzad (the so-called “Times 
Square Bomber”) gave an un-Mirandized confession and provided the FBI with valuable 
intelligence and evidence.171   
Although both of these cases are highly relevant because of their similarity to the 
interrogation of the Boston Bombing suspect, only Abdulmutallab moved to suppress 
statements given to law enforcement after the attempted bombing on the grounds that the 
Public Safety Exception was inapplicable.172  The Eastern District of Michigan denied 
Abdulmutallab’s motion, reasoning that the unwarned questions posed by law 
enforcement were made:  
in an attempt to discover whether [Abdulmutallab] had information about others 
 who could be on planes or about to board planes with explosive devices similar to 
 the one [he] used because, based upon his training, experience, and knowledge of 
 earlier al-Qaeda attacks, this was not a solo incident and the potential for a multi-
                                                
169 Elisa Labott et al., Al Qaeda Link Investigated as Clues Emerge in Foiled Terror 
Attack, CNN (Dec. 29, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/28/airline.terror.attempt/index.html.  
170 See Wright, supra note 155.  
171 Michael Wilson, Shahzad Gets Life Term for Times Square Bombing Attempt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at A25, available at 
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 prong attack existed even if [he] was unaware of any specific additional planned 
 attack.173  
 
Thus, the court concluded that law enforcement’s questions “sought to identify any other 
attackers or other potentially imminent attacks—information that could be used in 
conjunction with other U.S. government information to identify and disrupt such 
imminent attacks before they could occur,” and held that the circumstances of the 
questioning fell within the Public Safety Exception.174   
Abdulmutallab appealed, but the Sixth Circuit never issued an opinion on his 
Quarles argument because it found that he waived his right to an appeal by pleading 
guilty.175  However, several of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have issued opinions in cases 
involving bombs or potential explosions.  While none of these cases involved a high-
profile terrorist attack, they provide valuable insight into how a federal appellate court 
might analyze an unwarned interrogation similar to that of Dzhokhar Tsarneav.176   
 In United States v. Hodge, the Sixth Circuit explained that where a bomb is 
involved, the potential threat to the safety of law enforcement and the general public 
                                                
173 Id. at *5. Specifically, Abdulmutallab “was asked where he traveled, when he had 
traveled, how, and with whom; the details of the explosive device; the details regarding 
the bomb-maker, including where Defendant had received the bomb; his intentions in 
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174 Id. at *6.  
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(No. 13-cr-10200-GAO).  
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increases dramatically.177  In Hodge, officers received a reliable tip that a suspect was 
cooking methamphetamine at his residence and had a pipe bomb.178  After obtaining a 
warrant to search the residence, law enforcement entered the home and an officer, 
without giving Miranda warnings, asked the suspect whether there was “anything in the 
house that could get anyone there hurt, any active meth labs, meth waste, bombs, 
anything like [that] at all.”179  A couple of minutes later, officers overheard the suspect 
“blurt out that there was a bomb inside.”180  After the suspect gave the officers the 
location of the bomb, officers asked several more questions about the “construction, 
appearance, and method of detonation out of a concern for the safety of the officers in the 
house[,]” to which the suspect provided answers.181 
 The Sixth Circuit held that the lower court properly admitted the suspect’s 
statements under Quarles.182  The court relied on earlier opinions by the Second 
Circuit183 and Eleventh Circuit184 in reaching the conclusion that where officers 
reasonably believe that a bomb is on the premises, Miranda warnings are not required 
before asking questions about the bomb.185  Importantly, the court found that the test 
articulated in Williams—which required that officers using the Public Safety Exception 
reasonably believe a third-party could gain access to the weapon and use it to harm 
                                                
177 United States v. Hodge, 714 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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others—did not apply where a bomb was the potential threat to public safety.186  The 
court reasoned “in a case involving a bomb, the presence of third parties who can access 
the bomb is usually not a compelling consideration.  Bombs are potentially unstable and 
may cause damage if ignored or improperly handled by the police.”187  
 Similarly, in United States v. Khalil, the Second Circuit held that whether the 
police had successfully detained the suspect and gained control over the premises was not 
dispositive as to whether the Public Safety Exception applied.188  In Khalil, law 
enforcement acted on a tip from defendant Abu Mezer’s roommate that Mezer “had 
bombs in the apartment and planned to detonate them soon.”189  Mezer’s roommate gave 
police a key to the apartment and a diagram of the apartment indicating where the bombs 
were kept.190  Upon detaining the suspects, the police asked them about the construction 
of the bombs and whether or not one of the suspects “planned to kill himself” by 
detonating them.191  The court found that these questions fell within the Public Safety 
Exception because of their “potential for shedding light on the bomb’s stability.”192  
Further, in United States v. Spoerke, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Public Safety 
Exception notwithstanding that the officer had successfully detained the suspect and 
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removed pipe bombs from his vehicle.193  Thus, the Public Safety Exception was applied 
even though there was no possibility that a third party would intercept the bombs.194 
 However, in State v. Kane, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the presence of 
a bomb was insufficient for application of the Public Safety Exception.  The court held 
that Quarles was inapposite where a police officer had learned the nature and location of 
the defendant’s bomb.195  Hawaii’s high court reasoned that upon learning this 
information about the bomb, the officer’s next step was to call the bomb squad, meaning 
additional questions “cannot be said to have been designed solely for the purpose of 
addressing the danger posed by the explosive.”196 
 Together, these three decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals show a 
willingness to apply the Public Safety Exception where the threat to public safety is an 
explosion or bomb, although Kane shows that the presence of a bomb is not always 
dispositive.  However, as the Eastern District of Michigan reasoned in Abdulmutallab, 
law enforcement’s reasonable belief that another bomb may be in play may lead courts to 
consider the threat to public safety especially imminent.  
 However, where the sole justification for invoking the Public Safety Exception is 
that the suspect is a “known member” of a dangerous terrorist group, at least one district 
court has been unwilling to apply the Public Safety Exception.197  In United States v. 
Colon Osorio, officers initiated a traffic stop with the suspect that quickly escalated into a 
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scuffle.198  After detaining the suspect, the police observed a handgun on the pavement 
and asked the suspect if it was his.199  The court held that the Public Safety Exception did 
not apply because the police had the situation under control, and that the Public Safety 
Exception analysis should not change solely because the defendant was a convicted felon 
and a “known member of . . . a clandestine Puerto Rican terrorist group” that had claimed 
responsibility for terrorist acts.200 
 Finally, courts have been willing to apply the Public Safety Exception to cases 
involving questioning about accomplices.201  In Fleming v. Collins, the Fourth Circuit 
held that learning the identification of a suspect’s fleeing accomplice fell within the 
Public Safety Exception, especially because a dangerous crime had been committed hours 
earlier.202  Similarly, in United States v. Dodge, a federal district court held that where the 
location of a bomb was unknown, officers were permitted to question a suspect about the 
location of a potential accomplice who could detonate the bomb.203  
 In sum, courts have analyzed the Public Safety Exception quite differently where 
a bomb—as opposed to a firearm—poses a threat to officers or the general public.  While 
none of these cases discussed above involve situations where a bomb had already been 
detonated, as was the case of the Boston Marathon, they could provide valuable insight 
into how courts assess Tsarneav’s un-warned statements.  Although a suspect’s status as a 
known terrorist is not dispositive, courts have not considered whether a known terrorist’s 
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possession of a bomb automatically gives rise to the application of the Public Safety 
Exception.  If any of Dzhokhar Tsarneav’s un-Mirandized statements are admitted at his 
trial, and he argues on appeal that the Public Safety Exception is inapplicable, it is 
entirely possible that a court would analyze his interrogation under a police-friendly 
framework similar to the framework in Hodge.  However, a court may find that officers 
had sufficient control over the situation, and that Tsarneav’s status as a suspected terrorist 
is not dispositive, as in Colon-Osario.204  
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The Miranda rule was not created from whole cloth, but rather was a rule that was 
handed down after a robust debate over legislative proposals to respond to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling in Mallory v. United States.  Miranda represents a 
clear example of the U.S. Supreme Court acting as an American political institution 
whose decisions cannot be interpreted without consideration of the broader political 
environment in which it is embedded.  In this article, we demonstrated how the Court 
acted as a majoritarian institution and helped Congress overcome severe legislative 
obstructions in the United States Senate.  While Republicans and Southern Democrats 
supported a limited recitation of rights to the criminally accused by police officers, a 
small number of passionate Northern Democrats supported a broader recitation of these 
rights by U.S. Magistrate Judges.  The Warren Court’s response was a classic political 
compromise where both liberals and conservatives could claim a victory.  Namely, 
Northern Democrats could claim victory by the Court’s ruling that required a broad 
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recitation of rights applicable to criminal suspects at the federal and state level.  
Republicans and Southern Democrats, on the other hand, could claim victory by virtue of 
the fact that giving local law enforcement officers authority to explain these rights to 
criminal suspects would give them the flexibility to avoid having suspects appear before 
U.S. Magistrates prior to questioning.  
 Despite the victory that Republicans and Southern Democrats could claim in the 
wake of this victory, the ruling nevertheless proved unpopular and Congress responded 
by threatening to strip the Court’s jurisdiction, a response that proved too extreme for a 
number of lawmakers and was quickly shelved.  Instead, Congress succeeded in 
“overturning” the Miranda ruling in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.  As Keith Whittington has shown in other examples of legislation,205 bills like the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act often include constitutionally questionable 
sections—oftentimes invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court—that are designed to bring 
together a majority of legislators to ensure safe passage.  Indeed, there was widespread 
political support to see passage of this bill to ensure that financial assistance would be 
given to local law enforcement agencies to assist in the professionalization of local police 
forces.  The assistance through block grants, however, was not enough for a small 
coalition of Southern Democrats who were agitating to see the Miranda ruling overturned 
and were willing to hold the legislation hostage until a section of it altered the rule. 
Despite their victory in returning to the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard, even the 
Nixon Administration and subsequent presidents chose to ignore Section 3501’s 
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voluntariness standard as a matter of law enforcement policy and was even overturned by 
the conservative Rehnquist Court in Dickerson v. United States.   
  What differentiates the rulings by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in Quarles 
from the Warren Court’s rulings in Miranda is that the Quarles ruling was not announced 
following a robust political debate like the one that occurred prior to the Miranda ruling.  
This is especially true for the recent application of the Quarles Public Safety Exception to 
high profile cases that involve allegations of terrorist activity.  Because there was very 
little debate about the Quarles Public Safety Exception in Congress before and after it 
was handed down by the Burger Court, it can be argued that the executive branch policy 
of invoking Quarles lacks the political foundations that support the Miranda ruling.  If 
the creation of the Quarles Public Safety Exception lacks political foundation and 
support, and is merely a judicially-created rule that was not vetted after years of 
Congressional debate, then we argue that Congress should intervene and undertake a 
robust political debate about altering the Miranda ruling and applying the Quarles Public 
Safety Exception in the way that the executive branch currently does.  Although Congress 
has debated the efficacy of Miranda rights for terror suspects, the Public Safety 
Exception has not enjoyed the sustained, widespread, and robust debate like the one that 
occurred before and after the Miranda ruling.  To ignore a major exception to this policy 
in such an important area of law enforcement policy jeopardizes a political compromise 
that was shaped through a decade of institutional dialogues among Congress, the 
Executive Branch, and the Supreme Court that produced Miranda v. Arizona.   
 
 
